In this paper, we consider a zero-sum undiscounted stochastic game which has finite state space and finitely many pure actions. Also, we assume the transition probability of the undiscounted stochastic game is controlled by one player and all the optimal strategies of the game are strictly positive. Under all the above assumptions, we show that the β-discounted stochastic games with same payoff matrices and β sufficiently close to 1 are also completely mixed. We also provide a necessary condition under which the individual matrix games are completely mixed. We also show that, if we have non-zero value in some state for the undiscounted stochastic game then for β sufficiently close to 1 the β-discounted stochastic game also possess nonzero value in the same state.
Introduction
Stochastic game was first introduced by Shapley in 1953 ([Shapley(1953 ]). In his paper, Shapley showed the existence of value of a stochastic game and stationary optimal strategies for zero-sum, β-discounted stochastic games. Zero-sum undiscounted stochastic game was first introduced by Gillette ([GILLETTE(1957) ]). He show that unlike β-discounted stochastic game, there may not exist stationary optimal strategies in the undiscounted stochastic game. Blackwell and Ferguson ([Blackwell and Ferguson(1968) ]) studied Gillette's example and showed that this game does possess an ǫ-optimal behavior strategy for player I and a stationary optimal strategy for player II. In the year 1985 , Filar ([Filar(1981 ]) introduced the completely mixed stochastic game, this is an extension of the completely mixed matrix game defined by Kaplansky in 1945 ([Kaplansky(1945 ). Kaplansky's paper provides us many properties of a completely mixed matrix game which general matrix game does not have. Shapley's construction of shapley matrix ([Shapley(1953) ]) naturally extended most of the properties of completely mixed matrix game to completely mixed discounted stochastic game. Filar extended some of the results of completely mixed matrix game to the case of completely mixed undiscounted stochastic game under the assumption of single player controlled transition probability.
In this paper, we show that under the assumption of single player controlled transition probability, the undiscounted stochastic game is completely mixed follows that the β-discounted stochastic games are completely mixed for β sufficiently closed to 1. Also, we provide some necessary condition under which the individual matrix game are completely mixed. We provide a counterexample for the converse of our result.
Definition and preliminaries
Stochastic game was first formulated by Shapley ([Shapley(1953) ]). For a finite state and finite action two players zero-sum stochastic game, the game is played within two players (known as player 1 and player 2) and played in every day. In a specific day, the game will be in a specified state s and both player will play a matrix game R(s) and will get some reward which will add up to zero. Then the game will move to a new state in the next day and continuous on indefinitely. Throughout the rest of the paper unless stated otherwise we will be assuming player 1 tries to maximize his or her profit and player 2 tries to minimize the same.
Definition 1 (Two person zero-sum finite stochastic game). A finite zero-sum two person stochastic game can be think of a 5 tuple G = (S, A 1 , A 2 , r, q).The game is played between two players, player 1 and player 2. S is the set of all states in the stochastic game. We denote S = {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s K } as state space is finite. A 1 and A 2 be respectively the set of all pure actions available for player 1 and player 2 respectively. ie. in state s ∈ S player i for i = {1, 2} have pure actions A i (s) = {1, 2, · · · , m i }. r is the reward function and q is the transition probability matrix. If in state s ∈ S, player 1 and player 2 chooses pure action i and j respectively then the payoff player 1 gets in that specific day is r(s, i, j) and player 2 gets is −r(s, i, j) and the with probability q(s ′ |s, i, j) the game moves to state s ′ in the next day.
The payoff matrix in state s ∈ S is denoted as follows.
In general, the strategy for a player can depend on the whole history up to present day, but we will be considering only that strategies which do not depend on the previous history, ie. if the game is in state s 0 ∈ S today then for different past history of reaching s 0 both the player's strategy will be exactly same. This history independent strategy is known as stationary strategy.
Definition 2 (Stationary strategy). Denote P A k for k ∈ {1, 2} be the set of all probability distribution of player k's action space A i . Then a stationary strategy of player k is a function from state space S to the space P A k .
Definition 3 (Undiscounted payoffs for zero-sum stochastic game). Denote, r (n) (s 0 , f 0 , g 0 ) be the expected reward player 1 gets at n th day if the game starts in state s 0 , and player 1 and player 2 plays the strategy f 0 and g 0 respectively. If player 1 and player 2 plays the stationary strategy f 0 and g 0 respectively and the game starts in state s 0 ∈ S then the undiscounted payoff player 1 and player 2 gets respectively is
The undiscounted payoff is also known as limiting average payoff.
Definition 4 (β-discounted payoffs for zero-sum stochastic game). If player 1 and player 2 plays strategy f 0 and g 0 respectively and the game starts in state s 0 ∈ S then the limiting average payoff player 1 and player 2 gets respectively is
Definition 5 (Optimal strategy and value of the stochastic game). A pair of stationary strategy (f 0 , g 0 ) is said to be an optimal strategy in an undiscounted stochastic game if for the stochastic game we have,
where,
The value of the undiscounted stochastic game in state s ∈ S is denoted as v(s) = Φ(f 0 , g 0 )(s). A pair of stationary strategy (f 0 , g 0 ) is said to be an optimal strategy in the β-discounted stochastic game if we have,
The value of a stochastic game is always unique, whereas the optimal strategy of a stochastic game may not be unique.
Definition 6 (Single player controlled stochastic game ([Parthasarathy and Raghavan(1981) 
])).
A stochastic game is called single player controlled stochastic game if the transition probability is controlled only by one player. For a player 2 controlled stochastic game, we have, q(s
Through out the rest of the paper, unless stated otherwise we will be considering player 2 controlled stochastic game.
Definition 7 (Completely mixed stochastic game ([Filar(1981) ])). A stochastic game is said to be completely mixed if every optimal strategy for both the players are completely mixed. ie. for both player1 and player 2 in each state s ∈ S all the pure actions i and j for player 1 and player 2 are played with strictly positive probability.
Under the assumption of player 2 controlled stochastic game, The transition probability matrix Q(g) for some stationary strategy g of player 2, is defined as
For a stationary strategy (f, g) the reward vector is defined as
. Now the discounted and undiscounted payoff for the stationary strategy (f, g) can be written as-
Where, Q 0 (g) = I and the markov matrix Q * (g) is as follows.
The following results will be used to proof our results. Result 1. ([Kaplansky(1945) ], theorem 1 page 475) Consider a two person zero sum matrix game with payoff matrix M ∈ R m×n . Suppose player 2 has a completely mixed optimal strategy y ′ then for any optimal strategy strategy x ′ for player 1, 
for any player 2's stationary strategy g. We also have-
3 Results Lemma 1. Assume player 2 controlled transition. Suppose, ∃ β 0 ∈ [0, 1) and a completely mixed stationary strategy g 0 such that g 0 is optimal for player 2 (Minimizer) in every β-discounted stochastic game for for all β > β 0 . Let, β n ∈ [β 0 , 1) be such that β n ↑ 1. Let {f n } be optimal for player 1 (Maximizer) for β ndiscounted stochastic game. Suppose f n → f 0 coordinate-wise, ie. f n (s) → f 0 (s) for each state s ∈ S the f 0 is optimal for player 1 in the undiscounted stochastic game.
Proof. From ([Parthasarathy and Raghavan(1981) ]) we have under one player controlled transition probability, a undiscounted stochastic game has value restricted to stationary strategy. Suppose f n is optimal for β n -discounted stochastic game. As we have a completely mixed strategy g 0 for player 2 in the β n -discounted stochastic game form result 1 ([Kaplansky(1945)]) we have-
for any stationary strategy g for player 2, where
r(f n , g) ≡ v βn . Now we have [I −β n Q(g)] is a non-negative matrix hence the inverse is also a non-negative matrix. Hence we have the expression of r(f n , g) as follows.
Now we have f n → f 0 point-wise and the reward function r(., .) is a continuous function of the strategy of player 1. Hence, for any given ǫ > 0 we have,
coordinate-wise for all n ≥ N 0 , for some N 0 . e is a suitable length column vector with all entry as 1. Therefore we have,
As, (1 − β n ) is always non-negative for all β n ∈ (0, 1], we have.
We have,
is a stochastic matrix for each k. Therefore the above inequality reduces to the following inequality.
(
Now if we let β n ↑ 1 from result 2 ([Parthasarathy and Raghavan(1981)]) the above inequality will look as follows.
T is the value of the undiscounted stochastic game. This is true for any ǫ > 0. Hence f 0 constricted above is optimal strategy for player 1 in the undiscounted stochastic game. Theorem 1. Consider a finite, undiscounted, zero-sum, single player controlled stochastic game Γ, which is completely mixed. Then ∃ β 0 ∈ [0, 1) such that ∀ β > β 0 the β−discounted stochastic game Γ β obtained from the same payoff matrices are completely mixed.
Proof. Let us assume for contradiction that the undiscounted stochastic game is completely mixed but there does not exist any 0 ≤ β 0 < 1 such that the β-discounted game are completely mixed for all β > β 0 .
Then we can find a β 1 ∈ (β 0 , 1) such that there will exists a non-completely mixed strategy f 1 which is optimal for the β 1 -discounted stochastic game.
Similarly, we can find a β 2 ∈ (β 1 , 1) such that there will exist a non-completely mixed strategy f 1 which is optimal for the β 2 -discounted stochastic game, as we have the above assumptions.
Hence we will get a sequence β n ↑ 1 such that for all β n -discounted game we have non-completely mixed strategy f n . But we have finitely many states and finitely many pure actions in the stochastic game. Hence there exists a states and a pure action i for player 1 such that the i th coordinate of f n (s) is zero for infinitely many f n . ie. we can find a sub-sequence f n k of f n for which a fixed states and a fixed pure action i can be found, such that the i th pure strategy in thes th state is always played with zero probability in the optimal strategy . So applying the previous lemma, limit of this sub-sequence f n k of f n (denote as f 0 ) is optimal strategy for player 1 in the undiscounted game. f 0 is not completely mixed but optimal in the undiscounted stochastic game. This is a contradiction. So we can find a β 0 ∈ [0, 1) such that ∀ β > β 0 the β−discounted stochastic game Γ β obtained from the same payoff matrices are completely mixed.
The converse of the above theorem is not true. Let us consider an example of finite player 2 controlled zero-sum stochastic game where the β-discounted stochastic game is completely mixed for all β ∈ [0, 1) but the undiscounted stochastic game is not completely mixed. Example 1.
Note: s 2 is an absorbing state.
Consider the β-discounted game Γ β with the mentioned states and actions. The Shapley matrix ( [Shapley(1953) 
Clearly, the matrix R β (s 1 ) is completely mixed for all β ∈ [0, 1). R β (s 2 ) is also completely mixed. Hence the game Γ β is completely mixed for all β.
But if we consider the undiscounted stochastic game Γ. Consider the strategy f with f (s 1 ) = (1, 0), f (s 2 ) = (.5, .5). f is a stationary optimal strategy for player 1 in the undiscounted stochastic game Γ. Hence the game Γ is not completely mixed (has one optimal stationary strategy which is not completely mixed).
Lemma 2. Let, A = (a ij ) be a symmetric matrix of order n with a ij > 0 for every i and j. Let b T = (b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b n ) be a non-negative vector. Let, C = (c ij ) where c ij = a ij + b j . Suppose C is a completely mixed matrix game. Then, A is also a completely mixed matrix game.
Proof. Suppose, C is completely mixed. Since the value v of C is positive, from Kaplansky ([Kaplansky(1945) ]) det(C) = 0. Also from a result of Parthasarathy and Raghavan ([Parthasarathy and Raghavan(1981) 
Let y be a completely mixed optimal strategy for C. Then Cy = ve, where e is a vector with all coordinates equals to 1. It follows Ay = (v − b T y)e = δe, where
Since A is symmetric, it follows that δ is the value of the matrix game A and y is optimal strategy for A.
To complete the proof we will show that y is the only optimal strategy for both players in game A. Let, z be any optimal strategy of A. Then Az = δe, since y is a completely mixed optimal for both players. We also have Ay = δe. Thus A(y − z) equals to zero vector. Since A is non-singular, y = z. In other words, every optimal strategy coincides with y. This terminates the proof of the lemma.
We now give a simple counter example to show that if A is completely mixed matrix game, then C need not be completely mixed matrix game. Note A is completely mixed matrix game but C is not completely mixed matrix game.
Lemma 2 holds if we assume a pare of completely mixed optimal strategies exist for the two players in C instead of assuming C to be a completely mixed matrix game.
Theorem 2. Consider a finite, undiscounted, zero-sum, single player controlled stochastic game Γ which is completely mixed. Also assume that the all the individual payoff matrix R(s) are symmetric. Then the individual matrix game R(s) is completely mixed for all s ∈ S.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality R(s) is positive, that is every entry in R(s) is positive. Take any β > β 0 . Then the game R β (s) is completely mixed,
. Now the result follows from main theorem 1 and lemma 2.
Let us consider an example of a single player controlled undiscounted finite stochastic game which is completely mixed. This is a player 2 controlled stochastic game with 2 states S 1 and S 2 . Player 2 controllers the transition. In both S 1 and S 2 is player 2 chooses column 1 the game moves to S 1 in the next states and if player 2 chooses column 2 then the game moves to S 2 in the next state.
The unique optimal strategy for player 1 is {(1/2,1/2),(1/2,1/2)} for the above mentioned game. ie. choosing row 1 and row 2 is state S 1 with probability .5 and .5 respectively and choosing row 1 and row 2 is state S 2 with probability .5 and .5 respectively. The unique optimal strategy for player 2 is {(1/2,1/2),(1/2,1/2)} for the above mentioned game.
In example 14, we can see that for all β ∈ [0, 1) the β-discounted stochastic game Γ β is completely mixed. As both S 1 and S 2 are symmetric matrix theorem 11 says individual matrix game are completely mixed, which is easy to see in the above example. Remark: The converse of the above theorem is not true.The following example is a counter example.
